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TENT CITIES AND RLUIPA: HOW A NEW RELIGIOUS-
LAND-USE ISSUE AGGRAVATES RLUIPA 
Kelli Stout ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, when St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church chal-
lenged the City of Hoboken’s use of its zoning power to shut down 
the church’s homeless shelter, the New Jersey Superior Court ex-
pressed outrage.
1
  In a brief opinion, the court wrote, 
   The harm here is obvious, imminent and severe.  If the shelter 
is closed its occupants will be left without food or shelter.  Gov-
ernment alone is not presently able to cope with this grave social 
problem.  St. John’s represents the only bulwark these homeless 
people have.  To tear that bulwark away would be a travesty of jus-
tice and compassion.  Any inconvenience to the City of Hoboken 
and its other residents pales into insignificance when contrasted 
with what the occupants of the shelter would have to face if 
turned out into the city streets in winter weather.
2
 
Today, this weighing of the social importance of a church’s practice is 
absent from judicial analysis in religious-land-use cases.  In its place is 
a long line of inconsistent precedent and statutes, each attempting to 
articulate a test that accurately reflects the true meaning of the right 
to free exercise of religion. 
Since the United States Supreme Court narrowed its interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause
3
 in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith,
4
 the controversy over the proper treatment 
of religious land use has continued to challenge courts.  Congress re-
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2008, Uni-
versity of Kansas.  Thank you to Professor Catherine McCauliff and to Charlie Wilkes 
for their invaluable guidance throughout the writing process. 
 1 See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935, 
939 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983). 
 2 Id. (citation omitted). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 4 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) 
(“But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or 
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the 
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.”).  
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sponded swiftly to Smith, enacting a statute to make the free exercise 
of religion broader than the Smith Court had envisioned.  These sta-
tutory changes, however, led to a series of inconsistent decisions in 
the area of religious land use. 
Currently, temporary homeless shelters or tent cities pose new 
problems for courts struggling to find the proper analysis for deter-
mining whether restrictions on religious land use run afoul of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  By enacting the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000,
5
 Congress provided a sta-
tutory solution to some religious-land-use problems.  But the statute’s 
intended goal—broadening the scope of free exercise after Smith—is 
not always served in cases where churches are hosting homeless shel-
ters.  Some circuit courts have defined RLUIPA’s requirement of a 
“substantial burden on a religious exercise” in a restrictive way and 
thus have impeded the statute’s intended protections for religious 
land uses.
6
  Conversely, in some cases, Smith works to protect religious 
institutions subject to unfavorable city ordinances.
7
  Due to this dis-
crepancy, courts need to streamline their approach to religious-land-
use cases to establish reliable precedent and restore public confi-
dence in fair adjudication. 
Although Smith articulates a standard for the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause, it has been subject to inconsistent application 
and much confusion.  The unique case of tent cities shows the need 
for a clearer, more precisely defined test.  RLUIPA provides the ap-
plicable standard in the tent city context, but its failure to define what 
constitutes a “substantial burden on religious exercise” has also 
caused inconsistency.  To resolve this definitional confusion, federal 
courts should model a new test from the Washington Supreme 
 
 5 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 
(2006). 
 6 See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(adding that a substantial burden must render the religious exercise “effectively im-
practical” (citing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 
761 (7th Cir. 2003))); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 
1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden as “a significantly great restriction 
or onus upon such exercise”).  
 7 See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 
1362 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (ruling in favor of a church whose meal program for the 
homeless was shut down by city ordinance where the church showed that the ordin-
ance, although neutral and generally applicable, had no legitimate government in-
terest); Fifth Ave. Presbyterian v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22185, at *40–41 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004) (holding for a church which pas-
sively permitted homeless persons to sleep on its steps during the night after the lo-
cal government used local laws to force the homeless off the steps), aff’d 177 F. App’x 
198 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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Court’s standard for substantial burden, which takes into account 
both the context of the situation and the alternatives available to 
churches when determining if a substantial burden exists under 
RLUIPA. 
This Comment examines the controversy created by the tests as 
applied in religious-land-use cases and how the tests have fared when 
religious exercise involves providing services to homeless persons at 
the expense of the surrounding community’s right to a quiet and safe 
neighborhood.  Part II examines the development of the Free Exer-
cise Clause and religious-land-use regulation.  Part III shows how the 
constitutional and congressional tests for Free Exercise Clause viola-
tions have been applied when cities deny churches the ability to host 
homeless shelters or feeding programs on their property and, in par-
ticular, looks at the conflict that the tests have created for these types 
of cases.  Lastly, Part IV explores the unique issues tent cities have 
posed for courts and how a proper definition of a substantial burden 
under RLUIPA could resolve these issues in a way that fairly balances 
the interests of local governments and religious freedom. 
II. FREE EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS LAND USE:  
COURT VERSUS CONGRESS 
Constitutional challenges under the Free Exercise Clause first 
appeared in the twentieth century.  Initially, the Supreme Court ex-
pansively defined the right to free exercise of religion and treated it 
similarly to other rights.
8
  In the past two decades, however, the Court 
has curtailed the free exercise right and has made it more difficult for 
churches to challenge neutral and generally applicable government 
measures that burden their religious practices.
9
  This has made it es-
pecially difficult for churches to challenge land-use regulations and 
has set shaky precedent for new religious land uses. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause in the Twentieth Century 
In the nineteenth century, upon first review of the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Supreme Court determined the Clause to mean that 
 
 8 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (requiring a showing of a 
compelling government interest to regulate religious conduct). 
 9 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) 
(stating that neutral laws effecting religious practice need not be justified by a com-
pelling government interest); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see also Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Alle-
giance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 155, 200–13 (2004) (chronicling the changes to the Supreme Court’s approach 
in the last two decades).  
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“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, 
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social du-
ties or subversive of good order.”
10
  Almost a century later in 1963, the 
Court articulated a strict scrutiny standard for any government action 
that burdened the free exercise of religion.
11
 
In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh Day Adventist was fired from her 
job when she refused to work on her Saturday Sabbath day.
12
  She was 
then denied unemployment benefits for failing to take available jobs 
that would require her to work on Saturdays.
13
  The Court ruled that 
the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent benefits claims was not 
served by this denial of benefits.
14
  Ultimately, the Court adopted the 
standard that “governmental actions that substantially burden a reli-
gious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est.”
15
  This broad reading of the Clause proved fruitful for churches 
bringing claims under the Free Exercise Clause because they received 
the benefit of the most demanding level of scrutiny for any interfe-
rence with their free exercise rights, including those laws that apply 
neutrally.
16
 
Nearly three decades later, the law shifted again.  In Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Court limited the 
Sherbert rule to those government actions that are not generally appli-
cable and neutral.
17
  Justice Scalia reasoned that Sherbert “stand[s] for 
the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individ-
ual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”
18
  If a law meets the 
threshold standard of neutrality and general applicability, the gov-
ernment does not need to show that the action is narrowly tailored to 
 
 10 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 11 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“[A]ny incidental burden on 
the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state inter-
est in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’” 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))). 
 12 See id. at 399.  
 13 See id. at 400.  
 14 See id. at 407–09.  
 15 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (cit-
ing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03). 
 16 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (“The application of the 
Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an anomaly in the 
law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability.”). 
 17 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 18 Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
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achieve a compelling interest, even if the law burdens religious exer-
cise.
19
 
Thus, if the government action that allegedly violates religious 
freedom applies to all persons generally and is not targeted to dis-
criminate against a specific group, then courts will review its constitu-
tionality under a rational basis standard of review, asking whether the 
government action is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.
20
  If the government action is not neutral and generally ap-
plicable to all, then the court will review its constitutionality under 
strict scrutiny, asking whether the government action is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling government interest.
21
  Applying this 
reasoning, the Court in Smith found that the plaintiff’s use of peyote, 
in violation of a neutral and generally applicable criminal law, did 
not exempt them from the law and its consequences, including the 
loss of unemployment benefits.
22
 
The holding of Smith, however, left open many questions.  Jus-
tice Scalia did not explain how narrowly or broadly to interpret the 
Sherbert exception for laws that are not neutral and generally applica-
ble—those “individualized [government] assessments.” 
23
  Does the 
exception only apply to discretionary benefits programs like in Sher-
bert or does it extend to local government zoning decisions?  With no 
guidance as to the scope of the exception, lower courts are split on 
whether the exception applies to zoning-board decisions to grant or 
deny applications for variances, conditional permits, or accessory-use 
permits.
24
 
 
 19 See id. at 886 n.3 (“Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral 
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with 
these precedents.”). 
 20 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 21 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531–32; Family Life Church, 561 
F. Supp. 2d at 986.  
 22 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.  
 23 See Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws 
and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2000); see also Ashira Pelman 
Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 717, 745 (2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court has not explicitly pro-
vided a standard by which to distinguish between laws of general applicability and 
individualized assessments”).  
 24 Compare Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 
1056, 1072–73 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that regardless of RLUIPA the court could 
review the city’s denial of a special zoning permit based on system of individualized 
exemptions under strict scrutiny), Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 
886 (D. Md. 1996) (finding the compelling interest test under Smith applied to a his-
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Additionally, Smith created the “hybrid situation,” which posits 
that an alleged free exercise violation must be combined with an al-
leged violation of another constitutional right to invalidate a neutral 
and generally applicable law.
25
  In dictum, Justice Scalia wrote that up 
until Smith, the Court had only upheld a challenge to a neutral and 
generally applicable law based on a religious belief when the case in-
volved a claim under both the Free Exercise Clause and another con-
stitutionally recognized right—historically, either a free speech or pa-
rental right.
26
  Two constitutional rights—each alone not enough to 
overturn a law—may be sufficient when combined together to obtain 
higher judicial scrutiny to invalidate the law.
27
  While the parties in 
Smith never raised this argument, Justice Scalia’s dictum is often re-
lied upon in free exercise cases.
28
 
The Court applied the Smith test in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
29
 finding that a city’s ordinance prohibiting ritual 
animal sacrifices was not neutral and generally applicable and could 
 
toric preservation ordinance that created a system of individualized exemptions), and 
Alpine Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 993–94 (D. Colo. 
1994) (reviewing the city’s denial of a zoning permit to a church under strict scruti-
ny), with Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (finding that because everyone seeking a special zoning permit was sub-
jected to the same process and no discriminatory means were used by the zoning 
board, the zoning permit process was not one of individualized exemptions), and 
Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass’n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that the zoning ordinance was a neutral and generally applicable law under Smith 
where plaintiff challenged the rezoning request).  
 25 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 
(1990). 
 26 See id. at 881. 
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free 
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or paren-
tal right.  Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when other-
wise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not 
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from govern-
mental regulation.  We have never held that, and decline to do so now. 
Id. at 882.  
 27 See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Life Free Exercise: Smith, Luku-
mi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 857 (2001). 
The mechanics of the hybrid theory work something like this: neither 
free exercise nor parental rights standing alone can reach the results in 
[Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)], but somehow when the two 
claims are ‘hybridized’ or linked together they can do the work.  Thus, 
two insufficient constitutional interests—when combined—equal one 
sufficient hybrid claim. 
Id. 
 28 See id. at 858; Ira C. Lupu, Comment, Employment Division v. Smith and the 
Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 267 (1993). 
 29 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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not survive strict scrutiny.
30
  The Court found that the local govern-
ment enacted the ordinance specifically to prohibit the church from 
practicing animal sacrifices and not for the health and safety reasons 
that the government had presented.
31
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter attacked Smith and the 
hybrid method, stating “[i]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which 
another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception 
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith [test].”
32
  The peti-
tioner would only have to pair two rights together to obtain strict 
scrutiny under the Smith test,
33
 even if the law burdening religious ex-
ercise is neutral and generally applicable.  Justice Souter pointed out, 
however, that there would be no reason to pair free exercise and 
another right, if the plaintiff could win solely on the basis of the right 
paired with free exercise.
34
 
B. Congressional Response to Smith 
The Smith ruling sparked criticism from all sides.
35
  In an effort 
to undo Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) in 1993.
36
  RFRA reinstated strict scrutiny for cases where 
 
 30 See id. at 547.  
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes 
apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indi-
cation that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these 
requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.  These ordin-
ances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements.  
Id. at 531–32. 
 31 See id. at 545. 
 32 Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 33 See id.  
 34 See id. 
 35 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–45 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that Smith was wrongly decided); 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7777 (dai-
ly ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (citing a letter 
from Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion stating that there are “continuing 
sources of free exercise problems in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith”); 139 CONG. REC. H2356 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) 
(statement of Rep. Brooks) (“The Supreme Court’s decision 3 years ago transformed 
a most hallowed liberty into a mundane concept with little more status than a fishing 
license-thus subjecting religious freedom to the whims of Government officials. . . .  
Passage of this legislation is the only means to restore substance to the constitutional 
guarantee of religious freedom.”).  
 36 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2006).  The statute states, in part, the following: 
(a) The Congress finds that— 
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the government has “substantially burdened a person’s free exercise 
of religion” even if the burden results from neutral and generally ap-
plicable government actions or laws.
37
 
RFRA, however, had its own critics.  Professor Ira Lupu sug-
gested that RFRA may not have produced the intended benefits after 
all.
38
  Ultimately, the Act was unsuccessful, resulting in far fewer 
grants of relief than denials under it.
39
  Its application also demon-
 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of 
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as 
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exer-
cise without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Su-
preme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the gov-
ernment justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between re-
ligious liberty and competing prior governmental interests. 
Id.  
 37 § 2000bb-1(a)–(b).  The act states, in part, the following:  
(a) In general.  Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) Exception.  Government may substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling go-
vernmental interest. 
Id.  
 38 See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 586 
(1998) (“Moreover, the world of RFRA may have been filled with barely visible bene-
fits, included increased bargaining leverage for religious interests and an increased 
feeling of security among the deeply religious, as well as hard-to-calculate costs, in-
cluding social resentment over particular RFRA claims and the civic stresses caused 
by the necessity to defend against them.”).  For another critique of RFRA, see Amy 
Adamczyk et al., Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237 
(2004). 
 39 Professor Lupu observed that: 
We will never know how many RFRA victories these cases might have 
produced had [City of Boerne v. Flores] not terminated their RFRA 
claims, as it did for all cases involving state law (i.e., the huge majority 
of them).  But we do know that 143 of the 168 produced denials of re-
lief, only twenty-five claims produced grants of relief (for an overall win 
percentage of 15% of cases decided on the merits), and that nine of 
these twenty-five were in prisoner litigation, which typically involved 
the most basic infringements of religious liberty. 
Lupu, supra note 38, at 591.  
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strated that judges are uncomfortable exempting religion from the 
law, for fear of religious favoritism or a “slippery slope.”
40
  In 1997, the 
Court invalidated RFRA as an unconstitutional use of congressional 
enforcement power.
41
  The decision rendered the statute inapplicable 
to state government action but held that it still applied to federal 
government action. 
Nevertheless, Congress enacted another law, RLUIPA, in an at-
tempt to protect religious freedom.
42
  RLUIPA created a safeguard for 
religious institutions previously unable to combat generally applica-
ble land-use regulations.  The statute prohibits governments from 
enacting “a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substan-
tial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution” unless the government acts to further a com-
pelling government interest using the least restrictive means.
43
 
The Act was intended to eliminate the distinction between dis-
criminatory laws and laws of general and neutral applicability in the 
context of land-use regulations.
44
  Congress gave the Act a broad 
 
 40 See id. at 593. 
 41 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997); see also Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006) (“As 
originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal Government.  In City 
of Boerne v. Flores, we held the application to States to be beyond Congress’ legislative 
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 43 § 2000cc(a)(1).  The act states:  
(a) Substantial burdens. 
(1) No government shall impose or implement a land use regula-
tion in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the reli-
gious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or insti-
tution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the 
burden on that person, assembly, or institution-- 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
Id. 
 44 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ken-
nedy). 
Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in partic-
ular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes 
and also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of 
land use regulation.  Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in 
places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places 
where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes. Or the 
codes permit churches only with individualized permission from the 
zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in discriminatory 
ways. 
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scope and application to protect free exercise of religion.
45
  The Act 
defines “religious exercise” expansively as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be-
lief,” 
46
 eliminating any requirement of showing that the practice is 
necessary to the religion.
47
  For religious institutions seeking to pro-
vide homeless services, this provision is important because the reli-
gious activity need not be a required practice for all members of the 
religion.  The statute also does not require any pairing of rights to 
obtain strict scrutiny as Smith contemplated.
48
 
III. CURRENT CONFLICTS IN RELIGIOUS LAND USE:  
USING PROPERTY FOR HOMELESS SERVICES 
Courts have had to adapt to the changes in religious-land-use law 
quickly, but courts are also struggling as churches seek to expand 
their presence and become active in the community.  Temporary 
homeless shelters, often termed “tent cities,” present one of these 
challenges.  The shelters, which are set up temporarily on church 
property and often run by a secular organization, present a challenge 
for courts in applying religious-land-use laws and ultimately reveal 
flaws in the standards governing religious land use.  Because the cir-
cumstances of tent cities are so unique, courts are given an opportu-
nity to clarify the reach of the present law. 
 
Id.; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) (“RLUIPA is the latest of 
long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protec-
tion from government-imposed burdens, consistent with this Court’s precedents.”); 
David L. Abney, Religion and Housing for the Homeless, Using the First Amendment and the 
Religious Land Use Act to Convert Religious Faith into Safe, Affordable Housing, 8 SCHOLAR 
1, 10 (2005). 
 45 See § 2000cc-3(g) (“This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad protection 
of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act and 
the Constitution.”).  
 46 § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  
 47 See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 
(E.D. Va. 1996) (requiring plaintiff church to show “that it was central to their faith 
to invite the homeless into the church in order to establish a climate of worship”).  
But see Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009) (“Even assuming the [city] prohibited homeless shelters outright on 
RH-zoned property, Westgate would still fail to prove a substantial burden [under 
RLUIPA], because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at its specific loca-
tion was fundamental to its religious exercise.”), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. 
App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009). 
 48 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 
(1990). 
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A. Finding Help in Religion 
When homeless populations rise, cities—often faced with com-
plaints and without the resources to solve the homelessness prob-
lem—have created statutes, such as anti-camping or sleeping and 
panhandling statutes, to keep order in the community.
49
  In many in-
stances homeless people sleeping on public property become subject 
to police “sweeps” in which officers strictly enforce these laws, rather 
than solely in instances of specific complaints.
50
  Courts have typically 
upheld these laws against legal challenges because of public health 
and safety concerns, deferring to city governments.
51
 
The statutes, however, only temporarily disperse the homeless, 
especially when shelters become overcrowded.
52
  While it seems that 
cities, both large and small, contain several places for the homeless to 
take shelter during the days and nights, these shelters often are not 
located near schools, shopping, government-aid programs, or other 
services the homeless need and do not provide access to reliable 
transportation to get them to these locations.
53
  Even if shelters are 
available, at least one court has recognized that many homeless 
 
 49 See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing a city ordinance prohibiting camping on public property); see also Roulette v. City 
of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting 
sitting or lying on public sidewalks around commercial areas); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 43-1 (2009) (prohibiting solicitation of money in certain public areas); 
CLEVELAND, OH., CODE § 605.031 (2009) (prohibiting repeated solicitations after a 
person first refuses); CINCINNATI, OH., CODE § 910-12 (2009) (prohibiting solicitation 
of money in certain public areas). 
 50 See, e.g., Paul Shockley, Ex-Officers Defend Raid, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction, 
Co.) (June 21, 2010), http://www.gjsentinel.com/news/articles/ 
exofficers_defend_raid; Michelle Smith, R.I. Tent City Residents Forced to Move, LEDGER 
(Lakeland, Fla.) Sept. 6, 2009, at A2, available at 
http://www.theledger.com/article/20090905/news/909055050; Susan Poag, Home-
less Sweep Under Expressway, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/homeless_sweep.html; Mike Carter 
and Drew DeSilver, Dozens Protest Homeless Sweeps with City Hall Camp-Out, SEATTLE 
TIMES (June 9, 2008), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/ 
2004466035_homeless09m.html. 
 51 See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d at 1362 (upholding a city ordinance pro-
hibiting camping on public property); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d at 306 
(upholding a city ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on public sidewalks around 
commercial areas); Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) 
(upholding a statute prohibiting the solicitation of funds without a permit against a 
First Amendment challenge).  
 52 St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935, 939 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (observing that when homeless shelters are closed, 
homeless individuals are forced to return to the streets). 
 53 See Abney, supra note 44, at 2.  
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people “are ‘service resistant,’ and would be as unlikely to stay in an 
indoor church shelter as in a City shelter.”
54
 
Churches can offer a solution to these problems by permitting 
homeless shelters on property protected by RLUIPA and the Free 
Exercise Clause.  While many churches organize and manage home-
less shelters, increasingly the homeless have organized into secular 
camps, asking churches for temporary use of their land to set up a 
camp undisturbed by police.
55
  These tent cities have appeared all 
over the country, including Columbus, Ohio; Athens, Georgia; Cha-
tanooga, Tennessee; Seattle, Washington; and Ontario, California.
56
  
Groups of around 100 homeless people organize most tent cities and 
become a mobilized community.
57
  Host churches and other donors 
often provide meals, portable restrooms, and other services.
58
 
B. Local Governments’ Police Power to Regulate 
Many cities have resisted the alliance between homeless camps 
and religious institutions.  Using zoning laws, public-nuisance laws, 
and the public interest in health and safety, cities and residents have 
challenged homeless encampments on church properties.
59
  Zoning 
regulations permit cities to section off land for certain uses in the in-
 
 54 Fifth Ave. Presbyterian v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22185, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004).  
 55 See generally Tent Cities, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S 
HOUSING AND EQUALITY LEAGUE (SHARE/WHEEL), http://www.sharewheel.org/ 
Home/tent-cities (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter SHARE/WHEEL]; PINELLAS 
HOPE, http://www.pinellashope.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2010); Melanie C. Johnson, 
Tent City in Ontario Offers Shelter, Services, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 28, 
2007, at B1, available at http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/ 
PE_News_Local_D_tentcity28.2915a96.html; Dave Askins, Laws of Physics: Homeless 
Camp Moves, ANN ARBOR CHRON. (Sept. 2, 2009), http://annarborchronicle.com/ 
2009/09/02/laws-of-physics-homeless-camp-moves. 
 56 See Evelyn Nieves, In Hard Times, Tent Cities Rise Across the Country, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-18-
3933748920_x.htm.  “The phenomenon of encampments has caught advocacy 
groups somewhat by surprise, largely because of how quickly they have sprung up.”  
Id. 
 57 See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; see also PINELLAS HOPE, supra note 55. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See, e.g., Don Mann, Tent City 4 Coming Again to Woodinville, WOODINVILLE WKLY. 
(June 21, 2010), http://www.nwnews.com/index.php?id=1569:tent-city-4-coming-
again-to-woodinville&option=com_content&catid=34:news&Itemid=72; Mercer Island 
Residents Look to Stop Tent City in Court, MERCER ISLAND REP. (July 16, 2008),  
http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/east_king/mir/news/28076489.html; see also Chan-
dra Broadwater, Hillsborough Officials’ Sudden Interest in Homeless Camp Riles Opponents, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://www.tampabay.com/news/ 
growth/article1020464.ece. 
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terest of public health and safety.  Most churches exist in residential 
zones that tend to have strict regulations on the use of the land.
60
  
Some zoning ordinances directly limit meal or housing programs for 
the homeless;
61
 others require conditional use permits
62
 or semi-
public use permits
63
 to host these programs.  For the larger outdoor 
camps, most cities—if they do not prohibit the encampment out-
right—require churches to obtain temporary permits.
64
  Allowing 
churches to host homeless shelters and homeless service programs, 
however, can disrupt zoning purposes—the more variances and con-
ditional permits granted, the more distorted zoning plans become. 
Because of the public health and safety concerns that zoning is 
designed to protect, homeless programs face much opposition.  Cities 
have been reluctant to grant permits for housing and meal programs 
because these programs bring outsiders into communities, which can 
cause problems.
65
  Although some homeless individuals are simply 
persons who have been victims of bad financial luck, many others are 
ex-offenders, parolees, mentally handicapped, or alcohol or drug ab-
users.
66
  Tent cities pose an additional difficulty.  The camps can con-
 
 60 See Shelley Rose Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and 
Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighbor-
hood, 84 KY. L.J. 507, 526 (1995). 
 61 See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 
(E.D. Va. 1996) (concerning zoning code limiting feeding programs to thirty indi-
viduals for seven days in a six month period); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of 
Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D.D.C. 1994) (concerning a statute regulat-
ing programs conducted by churches in residential zones such as feeding programs).  
 62 See, e.g., Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1029 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (regarding a conditional use permit to operate a homeless 
shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009); 
Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (regard-
ing the application for a conditional use permit to operate a homeless shelter). 
 63 See, e.g., Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 
1554, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (concerning an application for a semi-public use permit 
to house homeless).  
 64 See, e.g., City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d 
406, 408 (Wash. 2009) (concerning the attainment of a temporary use permit to host 
a tent city on church property); Tent City—Temporary Homeless Encampments, MUN. 
RESEARCH AND SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Housing/ 
tentcity/tentcity.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (listing permits required for Wash-
ington cities). 
 65 See generally Saxer, supra note 60 (discussing the conflict between city residents 
and religious programs that serve nonresidents). 
 66 See Damien Cave and Lynn Waddell, ‘Tent City’ of Homeless Is Rejected in Florida, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/10/14/us/14homeless.html; Evelyn Nieves, supra note 56; Jennifer Levitz, Cities 
Tolerate Homeless Camps, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994409537920819.html; see also Jennifer Lebo-
STOUT_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  9:04 AM 
478 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:465 
tain over 100 people, all housed outdoors, without the support of 
twenty-four hour staff that a homeless shelter provides.
67
  The camps, 
however, are usually temporary and move from location to location 
every few months in an effort to ease the concerns that arise in each 
community.
68
  Despite their impermanence, many cities have refused 
to allow churches to host any kind of homeless camp.
69
  In some cases 
the residents file suit or petition the local government to stop 
churches from hosting tent cities.
70
 
C. The Shelter Cases 
While RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause have given religious 
institutions an advantage over other property owners wishing to con-
duct programs for the homeless on their property, religious institu-
tions still must overcome a difficult burden with any religious-land-
use test: Smith, RFRA, or RLUIPA.  Churches have long fought against 
local zoning ordinances prohibiting shelters and large meal minis-
 
vich, Miami Threatens to Fine State over Sex-Offender Camp, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 7, 
2009), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/southflorida/story/1175176.html? 
storylink=mirelated. 
 67 See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; PINELLAS HOPE, supra note 55; see also Jen-
nifer Levitz, supra note 66. 
 68 See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; Nicole Tsong, Belle’s First United Methodist 
Seeks Permit to Host Tent City, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/bellevueblog/2009701487_firstunitedmeth
odistappliesfortentcity4permit. 
html.  
 69 See Steve Bauer, Champaign Official: Court Proper Arena for Tent City Fight, NEWS-
GAZETTE, (Aug. 29, 2009), http://www.newsgazette.com/news/politics/ 
2009/08/29/champaign_official_court_proper_arena_for_tent_city_fight (city 
would only permit tent city group of homeless persons if the church housed them in 
a semi-permanent structure); Damien Cave and Lynn Waddell, supra note 66 (Coun-
ty Commission rejected permanent “Tent City” hosted on land owned by the Catho-
lic church in Tampa); see also City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of 
Christ, 211 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. 2009) (city refused to consider temporary use per-
mit application for church to host tent city for a three month period); City of Bothell 
v. Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, No. 04-2-11578 SEA (WA King County Super. Ct., 
June 10, 2004), http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Housing/tentcity/tentcity.aspx (de-
nying a city’s preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin a church from continuing to 
host a tent city); Nicole Tsong, Clergy Dispute Mercer Island’s Tent City Rules, SEATTLE 
TIMES,(Apr, 2, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/ 
2011347755_mercertent15m.html.  But see An Act Relating to the Housing of Home-
less Persons of Property Owned or Controlled by a Church, ch. 36.01, sec. 2, § (1)–
(2)(a), 2010 ESHB 1956 (Wash.) (enacting a law in Washington State that now per-
mits religious organizations to host tent cities but also permits local governments to 
regulate so long as the regulation does not impose a substantial burden on the reli-
gious organization and are necessary to protect public health and safety).   
 70 See Mercer Island Residents, supra note 59; see also Chandra Broadwater, supra 
note 59. 
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tries in the residential zones where most churches are located.  These 
cases, however, only offer a history of confused application of the var-
ious free exercise tests, producing conflicting results. 
1. Constitutional Analysis 
A decade before Smith, the New Jersey Superior Court, in St. 
John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, articulated one of 
the broadest approaches taken towards the Free Exercise right.
71
  The 
case involved a city’s challenge to a church-run homeless shelter in 
the basement of the church.
72
  In upholding the church’s right to 
sponsor the homeless shelter against local zoning ordinances, the 
New Jersey Superior Court explained the importance of churches 
hosting these programs; for centuries, sheltering the homeless was a 
religious activity that benefited communities.
73
  The court concluded 
that churches should not be required to meet the same health and 
safety standards as commercial establishments such as hotels.
74
  After 
Smith, however, courts began paying less attention to the religious 
freedom of churches to run beneficial homeless programs for the 
community and instead have become more deferential to city zoning 
practices. 
Many courts have denied relief to churches that do not follow 
applicable code procedures, either by failing to apply for a permit or 
failing to fix building and fire code violations.
75
  For example, in First 
Assembly of God v. Collier County, the city charged the church with vi-
olating several zoning ordinances and denied the church an acces-
sory-use permit to run a homeless shelter.
76
  The court found the zon-
ing ordinances neutral and generally applicable; it noted that the 
 
 71 See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983). 
 72 See id. at 937. 
 73 See id.  
 74 See id. at 939. 
 75 See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. Collier Cnty., 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(denying relief to a church that operated a homeless shelter in violation local zoning 
and building codes); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (denying relief for a church that operated a homeless shelter in 
without a required permit and later denied a permit when it failed to correct build-
ing code violations); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 
1032–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (denying relief to a church who failed to acquire a 
permit to operate a homeless shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. 
LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).  
 76 20 F.3d 419, 420 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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city’s interests in health and safety outweighed the burden on the 
church to relocate the shelter to a place zoned for such usage.
77
 
Although courts are deferential to city zoning procedures and 
regulations, they have been less willing to uphold excessive restric-
tions on homeless shelters and meal programs under the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
78
  In First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, a reli-
gious congregation of homeless people that conducted group meals 
and religious services weekly in a city park challenged an ordinance 
requiring a permit for these gatherings and limiting those permits to 
two per year.
79
  The court agreed with the church’s assertion that the 
city violated its congregation’s free exercise rights and freedom of as-
sembly rights.
80
  Using the Smith test, the court first determined that 
the statute was neutral and generally applicable, as it applied to all 
permit seekers alike.
81
  Then the court applied rational basis review 
but found that even under this deferential standard, the city had no 
legitimate interest in implementing an ordinance that so greatly re-
stricted the religious practice.
82
 
Echoes of St. John’s, however, still resonate in some cases.  In 
Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, the Western 
Presbyterian Church operated a meal program in its church for 
homeless persons.
83
  When the church and its program moved to 
another location, the city refused to let it continue its service and de-
nied the church a zoning variance.
84
  The court awarded a prelimi-
nary injunction to the church, preventing the city from shutting 
down the homeless shelter because the court found no justifiable in-
terest in restricting homeless services to certain areas of the city un-
der the Smith test and RFRA.
85
  The court noted that “by requiring the 
 
 77 Id. at 423–24.  The court cites to a three-factor test to determine if zoning laws 
violate the Free Exercise Clause used prior to Smith: “First, the government regula-
tion must regulate religious conduct, not belief.  Second, the law must have a secular 
purpose and a secular effect.  Third, once these two thresholds are crossed, the court 
engages in a balancing of competing governmental and religious interests.”  Id. at 
424 (citing Grosz v. Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 78 See, e.g., First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 
1353 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 
1225, 1239–40 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
 79 See First Vagabonds Church of God, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1357–58. 
 80 See id. at 1361–62.  Another party to the case raised a free speech claim, which 
the court found was violated.  Id. at 1361. 
 81 See id. at 1361–62.  
 82 See id. at 1362.  
 83 See 849 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 84 See id.  
 85 See id. at 78–79. 
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Church peremptorily to discontinue an important social welfare and 
religious program that has been in existence for over 10 years consti-
tutes irreparable injury.”
86
 
Another court was similarly deferential to a church in Fifth Ave-
nue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York.
87
  The church permitted 
homeless people to sleep on the steps of the church’s entrance.
88
  
Two years later, the city told the church that it would not permit the 
homeless to sleep there, and police came and removed persons sleep-
ing on the steps during the night.
89
  The court found that RLUIPA 
did not apply because the church was conducting a religious exercise 
that constituted a proper accessory use of its property; the city did not 
prohibit persons from sleeping on church property but used public 
nuisance laws to force them off the property.
90
  Using the Smith test, 
the court rejected the city’s argument that the substantial burden on 
the church’s religious exercise could be eliminated through the use 
of an indoor shelter; instead, the court suggested that the judiciary 
should not become involved in an inquiry about whether a substantial 
burden could be eliminated through other means while still respect-
ing religious exercise.
91
  After finding the city did not fairly enforce its 
neutral and generally applicable laws, the court applied strict scruti-
ny.
92
  The court found that the city’s actions were not narrowly tai-
lored because the police enforced the local laws under-inclusively and 
over-inclusively—arresting all persons on the property in that specific 
area of the city if just one person violated the law.
93
 
2. Analysis under RFRA 
Arguably, RFRA provided the most expansive support for reli-
gious institutions by reinstating heightened scrutiny for any substan-
tial burden on a religious exercise.
94
  Yet even this favorable approach 
 
 86 Id. at 79.  
 87 See No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), 
aff’d 177 F. App’x 198 (2d Cir. 2006).   
 88 Id. at *2. 
 89 Id. at *3.  
 90 Id. at *13–15.  
 91 See id. at *8–10.  “Adopting defendant’s approach would subject plaintiffs to a 
far higher standard than is required by the Second Circuit’s directive that demon-
strating a substantial burden is not a particularly onerous task.  A limited judicial in-
quiry is necessary because it respects the danger of under judicial involvement in re-
ligious activity.”  Id. at *9–10 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 92 See id. at *12–14, *39. 
 93 See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 at *12–14, *39.  
 94 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006). 
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to churches produces mixed results.  In Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. 
City of Daytona, a religious non-profit organization, Daytona Rescue 
Mission, Inc., brought suit against the city of Daytona under RFRA 
and the Florida version of RFRA after the city refused to allow a 
homeless shelter on the church’s newly acquired property.
95
  Unlike 
the court in Western Presbyterian, the district court found no substantial 
burden because the church failed to show that the zoning code pro-
hibited it from hosting a shelter or other homeless program any-
where within the city’s limits.
96
  The court found that the city, in draft-
ing its zoning ordinances, had a compelling interest in regulating 
homeless shelters and food banks, and the zoning regulations in the 
city code constituted the least restrictive means.
97
  The church, there-
fore, had to buy other land in a zone that allowed such uses in order 
to construct a homeless shelter.
98
 
As applied to more restrictive zoning regulations, however, the 
statute works to favor religious institutions.  Stuart Circle Parish chal-
lenged a local zoning ordinance that limited meal and housing pro-
grams for the homeless to only seven days within a seven-month pe-
riod and to no more than thirty persons.
99
  The church served meals 
every Sunday as part of its worship service.
100
  Under RFRA, the court 
found that making the church spread out its meal ministry through-
out its six churches to fit within the zoning statute would be too much 
of a burden.
101
  The city failed to show that it had a compelling state 
interest that would justify the restrictions placed on the church; 
neighborhood complaints were not enough.
102
  Still, this higher stan-
dard of scrutiny under RFRA may not be necessary for these cases be-
cause the more restrictive local ordinances on land use will likely be 
unable to pass rational basis review as articulated in First Vagabonds 
Church above.
103
 
 
 95 See 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1555–56 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
 96 Id. at 1560. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id.  
 99 See Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. 
Va. 1996). 
 100 Id.  
 101 See id. at 1238–39.  
 102 See id. at 1239.  
 103 See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 
1361–62 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
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3. Analysis under RLUIPA 
After the Court invalidated RFRA as it applies to the states, Con-
gress enacted a similar statute but restricted its application to reli-
gious land use and the Free Exercise rights of institutionalized per-
sons.
104
  By mandating a strict scrutiny standard for substantial 
burdens on religious land use, RLUIPA was, in part, intended to pro-
tect religious land use against zoning ordinances that unduly restrict 
religious exercise.
105
  For churches challenging local zoning ordin-
ances, so that congregations may organize a homeless shelter, this is a 
difficult standard to meet because of the deference given to local zon-
ing boards and the notion that running a homeless shelter is not a 
necessary religious practice. 
In May 2009, the Florida Court of Appeals denied a church’s 
free exercise claim under RLUIPA where the church refused to apply 
for a permit for its homeless shelter and incurred fines for continu-
ing operations.
106
  Narrowing the application of the Free Exercise 
Clause, the court found that the church failed to show a substantial 
burden “because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at 
its specific location was fundamental to its religious exercise”
107
—a 
requirement not listed in the statute.
108
  In addition, the court noted 
that a church must also exhaust all administrative remedies before 
bringing a claim.
109
 
Similarly, Family Life Church was denied relief for operating a 
homeless shelter in violation of zoning laws.
110
  The church also 
needed a conditional use permit to continue providing services.
111
  
When the church filed for the permit, inspectors found 105 violations 
 
 104 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 105 See 146 CONG. REC. S 7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (stating a need for the legislation because “[c]hurches in 
general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discri-
minated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and 
discretionary processes of land use regulation”). 
 106 See Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1029–30 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 
(Aug. 13, 2009).  The church also brought a claim under the Florida Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, but the court stated the same analysis is used under RLUIPA.  
Id. at 1030. 
 107 Id. at 1032.  
 108 See § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”). 
 109 See Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032. 
 110 See Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 981 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
 111 See id. 
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of the city codes.
112
  After an eight-month application process, the city 
denied the church’s application.
113
  The court found no substantial 
burden on religious exercise; a delay in the permit process and other 
regulations for the operation of a shelter were only incidental bur-
dens.
114
 
D. Conflicting Precedent 
Within these cases, courts have ruled consistently where certain 
fact patterns are involved.  If a church fails to utilize the zoning 
process to address its grievance, as in First Assembly of God, Westgate Ta-
bernacle, and Family Life Church, courts will refuse relief.
115
  If the zon-
ing regulations on land use are unnecessarily excessive, however, 
courts are comfortable using Free Exercise to invalidate the statutes 
as they apply to the church.
116
  Problems arise when a court must de-
cide how to evaluate a substantial burden on religious exercise under 
the religious-land-use tests.  RLUIPA does not define substantial bur-
den, but Congress articulated that it intended the definition to be in-
terpreted in light of Supreme Court precedent.
117
 
 
 112 See id. at 983.  
 113 See id. at 987. 
 114 See id. at 987–88.  The court stated, “[m]uch of the burden on Family Life was 
self-imposed by its premature opening of the shelter before seeking a permit.”  Id. at 
988.  
 115 See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. Collier Cnty., 20 F.3d 419, 424 (11th Cir. 
1994); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1031–32 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 
13, 2009); Family Life Church, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 116 See, e.g., First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 
1353, 1357–58 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. 
Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
 117 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch, Sen. Kennedy, and Sen. Reid) (“The Act does not include a definition of 
the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is not the intent of this Act to create a new 
standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise.  Instead, 
that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. . . .  The term ‘substantial burden’ as used in this Act is not intended 
to be given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
concept of substantial burden or religious exercise.”); see also Westchester Day Sch. v. 
Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Since substantial burden is a 
term of art in the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, we assume that Con-
gress, by using it, planned to incorporate the cluster of ideas associated with the 
Court’s use of it.”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court’s definition of ‘substantial burden’ within its 
free exercise cases is instructive in determining what Congress understood ‘substan-
tial burden’ to mean in RLUIPA.”). 
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The Supreme Court, however, has offered little help in this area.  
Years before the enactment of RFRA and RLUIPA, the Court defined 
substantial burden as “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an im-
portant benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or 
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by reli-
gious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
118
 
Read broadly—as RLUIPA intends the definition of substantial 
burden
119
—this definition protects free exercise by requiring only a 
showing of pressure to modify, but not an actual violation of, one’s 
beliefs to establish a substantial burden.  In interpreting RLUIPA and 
the Free Exercise Clause under Smith, the circuit courts have drawn 
from this earlier definition but have failed to come to a consensus on 
a proper definition in the religious-land-use cases. 
The First, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have taken part of 
the Supreme Court’s definition, holding that a substantial burden ex-
ists “when the government put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent 
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
120
  The Seventh Cir-
cuit, which the Northern District of Illinois was bound to follow in 
Family Life Church, also added that the government action “necessarily 
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering 
religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable.”
121
 
The Fifth Circuit follows a similar but more stringent defini-
tion—that the person must “significantly modify” his behavior and vi-
olate his beliefs.
122
  The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits take different 
 
 118 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
 119 See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (With RLUIPA, 
“Congress intended to create a broad definition of substantial burden.”). 
 120 Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (inter-
nal quotations omitted) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Flori-
da, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)); see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718  (A substantial burden ex-
ists when the government is “putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify 
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”); see also Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 
280 (3d Cir. 2007) (The Third Circuit also accepts a showing that “a follower is 
forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting bene-
fits otherwise generally available to other[s] . . . versus abandoning one of the pre-
cepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit.”); Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482 
F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2007); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 121 Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 997 (citing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City 
of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 
561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  The Seventh Circuit cites to both the Su-
preme Court definition in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 
136, 141 (1987) and the definition in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761.  
 122 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that substantial 
burden “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior 
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approaches under RLUIPA, defining substantial burden as a “signifi-
cant” restriction or pressure.
123
  This pressure must be “great”
124
 or 
“tend[] to force adherents to forego religious precepts.”
125
 
The Second Circuit has reasoned that because the Supreme 
Court held that “generally applicable burdens, neutrally applied are 
not ‘substantial,’”
126
 the court will look at additional factors to deter-
mine whether a substantial burden exists, including whether the 
church had “quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives” and 
whether the zoning decision was conditional or absolute.
127
  Following 
Second Circuit precedent, the court in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian added 
that finding a substantial burden is “not a particularly onerous 
task.”
128
 
These inconsistent definitions of substantial burden have 
created a spectrum of government actions that constitute a substan-
tial burden.  For example, the Second Circuit found a substantial 
burden where a village denied the zoning application of a Jewish day 
school that wished to expand on its own land to meet its growing 
needs because no quick and financially feasible alternatives for the 
school existed, and the denial was absolute.
129
  The Seventh Circuit, 
however, found no substantial burden when a village put restrictions 
on the size of a church and the religious activities that a church could 
 
and significantly violates his religious beliefs”).  The Fifth Circuit clarified that “sig-
nificant” means “it either (1) influences the adherent to act in a way that violates his 
religious beliefs, or (2) forces the adherent to choose between, on the one hand, en-
joying some generally available, non-trivial benefit, and, on the other hand, following 
his religious beliefs.”  Id. 
 123 See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden as “a significantly great restriction or onus 
upon such exercise”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 
1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant 
pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her beha-
vior accordingly”). 
 124 San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034 (defining substantial burden as “a sig-
nificantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”). 
 125 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227. 
 126 Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389–91 
(1990)). 
 127 Id. at 352. 
 128 Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, No. 01–11493, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis, 
357 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004)).  
 129 See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352–53.  
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hold because the restrictions were “merely incidental” and did not 
render the practice effectively impracticable.
130
 
The different ways of approaching what constitutes a substantial 
burden have contributed to the contradictory results of the shelter 
cases, including the conflicting results in Western Presbyterian and Day-
tona Rescue Mission.
131
  The court in Western Presbyterian concluded that 
the church met the substantial burden requirement by showing that 
serving the homeless is an integral part of its faith;
132
 however, the 
court in Daytona Rescue Mission explicitly rejected the same argument 
and proposed a more stringent standard for substantial burden.
133
  As 
long as the church could serve the homeless anywhere in the city lim-
its, the absolute denial to do so in a specific location was not a sub-
stantial burden.
134
 
The danger in the various substantial burden tests concerns how 
many exceptions to neutral and generally applicable laws courts 
should afford religious institutions.  By granting many exemptions, 
courts run the risk of a slippery slope that opens the door too wide 
for religious freedom—to the point that the court may begin to allow 
certain activities that would be impermissible if not for the cloak of 
religion shielding churches from the government’s police power.
135
  
Church-hosted tent cities walk the fine line between these tests.  In 
many cases, the practice of hosting a tent city is not an indispensable 
practice to the church, but it is part of a mission of the church to 
serve others and help the community.
136
  An outright denial to host 
tent cities is too burdensome, but these tests offer different conclu-
 
 130 Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998–99 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 131 Compare Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 
1555–56 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding no substantial burden when city denied permit for 
church to build a homeless shelter on newly acquired property), with Western Pres-
byterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D.D.C. 1994) 
(finding a substantial burden when city denied permit for church to host homeless 
feeding program at new church location). 
 132 See Western Presbyterian, 849 F. Supp. at 79. 
 133 See Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1560. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See Lupu, supra note 38, at 593 (“Better no exemptions, they might well say, 
than a pattern of exemptions riddled by religious favoritism.”); Frederick Mark Ge-
dicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 574 (1998) (“There no longer exists a plausible explana-
tion of why religious believers- and only believers- are constitutionally entitled to be 
excused from complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices moti-
vated by moral belief.”). 
 136 See Levitz, supra note 66; Tent City 4, LAKE WASH. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, 
http://www.lwumc.com/tentcityhtml (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). 
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sions as to the extent of the burden that a city can place on the prac-
tice of hosting tent cities. 
IV. THE DIFFICULTY IN ASSESSING CLAIMS OF  
CHURCH-HOSTED TENT CITIES 
The debate on the definition of substantial burden further af-
fects religious institutions wishing to host tent cities on their proper-
ty.  While many municipal courts have arbitrated fights between 
churches hosting tent cities and local governments, only one prece-
dential case has emerged recently.  The case, argued in the Washing-
ton state court system, advances a broader definition of a substantial 
burden.
137
 
A. Lessons from Washington 
The facts are similar to those of the shelter cases.  In 2004, the 
City of Woodinville, SHARE/WHEEL, and Northshore Church en-
tered into a contract permitting a tent city to stay on church-owned 
property for a three-month period, provided it obtained a valid tem-
porary-use permit.
138
  As another host site withdrew for the May 
through July months, Northshore agreed to apply quickly for a tem-
porary use permit to allow the camp to stay on its property.
139
  A few 
months before the church applied, however, the city put a six-month 
moratorium for sustainable development studies on all land use per-
mit applications in residential zones where the church was situated.
140
  
The city refused to process the application in light of the moratorium 
and additionally refused to allow the tent city to camp outside the 
areas covered by the moratorium.
141
  Northshore Church allowed the 
tent city to use its property anyway, and the city brought suit.
142
  The 
Washington Supreme Court held that the city’s refusal to process the 
church’s requested permit on the basis of the moratorium violated 
the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington State Constitution.
143
 
 
 137 See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d 406, 
411 n.4 (Wash. 2009).  
 138 See id. at 408.  
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id.  
 143 See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411.  The Washington State Constitution states:  
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, 
belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one 
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of re-
ligion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so con-
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While noting that the state’s protection of free exercise is broad-
er than the protection granted in the federal Constitution, Justice 
Johnson wrote that the church only needs to show that the govern-
ment action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious belief the 
church wishes to exercise.
144
  Because the city conceded that hosting 
the tent city is part of the church’s free exercise, the issue of whether 
providing for the homeless reflected a sincerely held religious belief 
was not discussed, though the court noted that the church had not 
engaged in this type of activity previously.
145
  The case turned on 
whether the city’s refusal to process the permit because of the mora-
torium substantially burdened the church’s free exercise.
146
  This as-
sessment, according to Justice Johnson, requires the court to examine 
the context of the burden and to “look at any alternatives the regula-
tion leaves open”
147
—a test similar to the Second Circuit’s but without 
the “substantial pressure” language or a second inquiry to determine 
if the denial was conditional or absolute.
148
  Accordingly, the court 
found that refusing to process a permit was a substantial burden.
149
 
The Northshore case offered hope for churches—in Washington 
at least—to expand tent city programs in their communities.  But 
does the Washington Supreme Court’s deferential approach to reli-
gious institutions go too far?  The substantial burden standard articu-
lated by the court considered the effect of the tent city on neighbors; 
however, it found that this was better settled by reasonable city regu-
lations.
150
  Additionally, the city did not deny the permit outright but 
merely delayed the process.  The court, however, found this excuse 
unavailing.
151
  Perhaps the city would have had a stronger case had it 
fought the religious exercise issue because the church had never 
 
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent 
with the peace and safety of the state.  
WASH. CONST. art. I § 11. 
 144 See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 409–11. 
 145 See id. at 410. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Id. at 411 n.4.  “For example . . . the Church conceded it would be possible to 
house Tent City inside the Church.  Worship traditionally takes place inside a church 
and this alternative would obviate many of the neighbor/city legitimate concerns.  
We make no decision on such a regulation because the City did not allow such alter-
native.”  Id.  
 148 Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(requiring courts to look at financially feasible alternatives and whether the denial of 
a permit was conditional or absolute).  
 149 See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See id. 
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hosted a camp in the past, and thus this activity was not a central reli-
gious exercise of the church. 
But this case may also represent undue judicial activism in a 
struggling economy, a similar theme found both in St. John’s and 
Western Presbyterian.
152
  Professor William P. Marshall argues that 
judges often do not give substantial weight to the state’s interest in a 
given situation because it is unlikely that one exemption will threaten 
that interest.
153
  Even so, the tent city in Northshore complicates judicial 
assessment under the Free Exercise Clause or religious-land-use sta-
tute because other interests are involved, including public nuisance 
and safety concerns due to the size of the camp.
154
  The church is not 
just asking for an exemption to practice a specific religious ritual, like 
the use of peyote; it is asking to do something that affects the entire 
community. 
B. How Church-Hosted Tent Cities Expose Flaws in Free Exercise 
In Northshore the church met a complete ban on permit applica-
tions.
155
  If a city ordinance is more narrowly tailored than that in 
Northshore and bans outdoor camps in residential zones or refuses an 
application for a temporary homeless camp out of concern for the 
surrounding community, how should a court react?
156
  Tent cities are 
 
 152 See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Ad-
justment, 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994).  
 153 See William P. Marshall, Correspondence on Free Exercise Revisionism, In De-
fense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 312 (1991).  
 154 See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411. 
 155 In fact, a year after Northshore was decided, the state of Washington passed a 
law, which prohibits local governments from “impos[ing] conditions other than 
those necessary to protect public health and safety and that do not substantially bur-
den the decisions or actions of a religious organizations.”  An Act Relating to the 
Housing of Homeless Persons of Property Owned or Controlled by a Church, ch. 
36.01, sec. 2, § (2)(a), 2010 ESHB 1956 (Wash.).  This law, however, fails to solve the 
definitional problem of the “substantial burden” language.      
 156 One editorial explains the conflict between neighbors and churches when a 
church sought permission to use their land for a tent city:  
     Organizers of Hillsborough Cares tried to make their plan work with 
generous buffer zones, a single entrance, a tall fence and setbacks even 
wider than required for building a jail.  They promised strict screening 
of residents.  They talked about police presence and brought off-duty 
officers from Pinellas Hope who said reassuring things.  They set a 
maximum stay of 90 consecutive days.  In short, they offered up every-
thing but a drawbridge and a moat.   
     None of it was enough [for the city commission]. 
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unique.  They offer a solution to problems of homelessness in com-
munities and overcrowded shelters, yet they can be a real—although 
often temporary—nuisance due to both their size and the fact that 
they are located outdoors.  These situations walk the fine line of reli-
gious freedom, but because of the unusual nature of tent cities, 
RLUIPA and the Smith test provide no clear answers on which side of 
the line these cases should fall. 
1. Substantial Burden on a Religious Exercise 
Both RLUIPA and the Smith test require that the religious insti-
tution demonstrate a substantial burden on a religious exercise in 
order to survive a claim.  RLUIPA offers an expansive definition of 
“religious exercise” but fails to define “substantial burden” in the sta-
tute, leaving it up to the courts to decide.
157
  Thus, courts have been 
forced to rely on the varying circuit courts’ definitions when applying 
either the Smith test or RLUIPA.
158
  But the facts surrounding tent ci-
ties present a more difficult issue. 
Churches do not run, organize, or control tent cities; rather, 
tent cities are a separate secular organization of homeless people.
159
  
Churches and other religious institutions cooperate with tent cities by 
providing the property, monetary donations to maintain the camp, 
and often meals on a daily basis.
160
  The religious exercise in these sit-
uations is unclear; should it be considered a meal ministry, or can 
 
Sue Carlton, Tent City Plans Die but Hope Shouldn’t, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2009, at B1, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/tent-city-
plans-die-but-hope-shouldnt/1043722. 
 157 “The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) 
(2006).  
 158 See, e.g., Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(defining substantial burden as “when the government put[s] ‘substantial pressure 
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs’” (quoting Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987))); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining 
substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant pressure which directly coerces the 
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”); San Jose Christian 
Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial 
burden as “a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”).  But see 
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007) (look-
ing at additional factors to determine a substantial burden including whether the 
church had “quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives” and whether the 
zoning decision was conditional).  
 159 See Levitz, supra note 66; SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55. 
 160 See Levitz, supra note 66; Tsong, supra note 68; Debera Carlton Harrell, Ballard 
Hosts Tent City, SEATTLE P-I (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/ 
353338_ballard01.html; see also Mann, supra note 59.  
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camp-hosting be characterized as a religious exercise?  If courts are 
unable to determine the religious exercise in question, they will be 
unable to determine whether the government’s actions substantially 
burden that exercise. 
Although tent cities have been present throughout history, 
church-hosted tent cities are a relatively new phenomenon.
161
  Most 
churches have never hosted tent cities, or even housed or fed the 
homeless on their property.
162
  In St. John’s, Western Presbyterian, and 
Stuart Circle Parish, the courts took the history of hosting homeless 
programs at the church into account.
163
  And the Washington Su-
preme Court in Northshore commented that the church had never be-
fore engaged in any homeless services, let alone hosting a tent city.
164
  
Churches starting new ministries, such as those wanting to host 
homeless shelters, may have difficulty showing the city’s denial of a 
permit is a substantial burden. 
Additionally, many of these churches host these camps tempora-
rily.
165
  While this weakens the government’s nuisance claim, courts 
may not view this temporary activity, one that could be done year-
round and more substantially, as an important religious practice or as 
a valid religious exercise under the Smith test.  The RLUIPA statute 
offers a broader definition of religious exercise—exercise that does 
not have to be central to or compelled by the religious belief.
166
  
Courts in general are deferential to churches when making a finding 
as to whether the religious belief is valid,
167
 and in some cases, like 
 
 161 See Evelyn Nieves, supra note 56. 
 162 See generally City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 
P.3d 406, 410 (Wash. 2009) (“There is no issue raised here of whether hosting Tent 
City is important or central to the Church’s exercise (though the Church has never 
before engaged in such practice around or in its church).”); Jennifer Levitz, supra 
note 63; Tsong, supra note 68; Debera Carlton Harrell, supra note 160. 
 163 See Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D. 
Va. 1996); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 
77, 79 (D.D.C. 1994); St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 
479 A.2d 935, 939 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983). 
 164 Northshore, 211 P.3d at 410 (noting that “the Church has never before engaged 
in such [a] practice.”). 
 165 See generally id.; Levitz, supra note 66; Tsong, supra note 68; Harrell, supra note 
160.  
 166 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5 (7)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes 
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of reli-
gious belief.”). 
 167 See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); 
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to 
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of 
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Northshore, the local government does not challenge the validity of the 
religious exercise.
168
  Nevertheless, the centrality or importance of the 
religious exercise to the religion is still a factor courts consider when 
evaluating cases under RLUIPA.
169
 
For example, in Westgate Tabernacle, the court found the church 
failed to satisfy the substantial burden standard because it was unable 
to “show that running a homeless shelter at its specific location was 
fundamental to its religious exercise.”
170
  The court reasoned that the 
church could have found other suitable property in an appropriately 
zoned area for its shelter.
171
  In this instance, the broad standard of-
fered by RLUIPA becomes almost meaningless.  Churches wishing to 
host tent cities will still bear as difficult of a burden of showing that 
the activity is central to their religious exercise as they would have 
under the Smith test because many have not hosted homeless camps 
on their property before. 
The tests of the circuit courts offer little hope for tent cities.  
The Seventh Circuit offers a definition requiring judges to determine 
the most minimal activities or facilities the church needs to prac-
tice.
172
  By denying permits to churches to host tent cities outside, the 
Seventh Circuit test would not render the religious exercise of serving 
the poor “effectively impractical” if churches could choose to let the 
homeless sleep inside their churches.  And the Second Circuit’s 
broader definition ignores the context of the individual situation.
173
  
 
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 
878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 168 See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 410 (“The City conceded in its briefing in this case 
the Church’s sincerity of belief.”); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 
So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“The County does not dispute that the 
plaintiffs house the homeless based on deeply cherished religious beliefs.”), reh’g de-
nied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009). 
 169 See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 
(E.D. Va. 1996) (“However, the plaintiffs showed that it was central to their faith to 
invite the homeless into the church in order to establish a climate of worship.”); 
Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032 (“Even assuming the [city] prohibited homeless 
shelters outright on RH-zoned property, Westgate would still fail to prove a substan-
tial burden, because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at its specific 
location was fundamental to its religious exercise.”).  
 170 Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032.  
 171 See id. 
 172 See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (cit-
ing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 
2003)); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 173 See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 
2007) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389–91 
(1990)). 
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Housing the tent-city residents indoors could also be a financially 
feasible alternative that is accepted by the Second Circuit.
174
 
Homeless people who do not desire to be in shelters —or in-
door-church housing, which resembles shelter living—organized tent 
cities as an alternative.
175
  Many of these persons are service resistant, 
and the freedom of the outdoor camp is what attracted them to tent 
cities in the first place.
176
  If courts force churches to host camps in-
doors, tent cities might look for suitable camp property elsewhere, 
inhibiting churches from hosting programs at all.  It seems unlikely 
that the Constitution would doom this practice from the beginning. 
2. RLUIPA and Smith Test Provide Same Protection 
RLUIPA may prove unhelpful in other ways as well.  It is possi-
ble, however, that zoning decisions could receive the strict scrutiny 
standard under one interpretation of Smith, negating the need for 
RLUIPA in religious-land-use cases, because many zoning decisions 
are “individual assessments.”
177
  In fact, some courts have held that 
zoning board decisions do receive strict scrutiny under Smith.
178
  In 
the case of tent cities, unless the city has a flat prohibition on tent ci-
 
 174 See id. at 352. 
 175 See Rocky Neptun, Renters Union Calls for Tent City in San Diego, S.F. BAY AREA 
INDEP. MEDIA CTR. (Dec. 30, 2009, 10:32 PM), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/ 
2009/12/30/18633908.php (A homeless man, responding to reporter’s question re-
garding his dislike of shelter: “‘Shelters are fine institutions, but not everyone be-
longs in an institution,’ he chortles. ‘I tried going a few times but it is such a demean-
ing process; some staff treat you as public vermin, criminals and sickos, while, others 
order you about like little children or mental retards.’”); Shannon Moriarity, The 
Dismantling of Nickelsville, END HOMELESSNESS (Oct. 2, 2009, 8:12 PM), 
http://homelessness.change.org/blog/view/the_dismantling_of_nickelsville (“To 
those who called [the tent city] ‘home’ for the past year, it was more than a place to 
sleep.  It was a community where people typically shunned by society were accepted.  
It was a place where ‘power in numbers’ meant safety, assistance, and having a 
voice.”).  See generally SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55. 
 176 See id.  
 177 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (cit-
ing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)) (“[W]here the State has in place a sys-
tem of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘re-
ligious hardship’ without compelling reason.”).  
 178 See, e.g., Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 
1056, 1072–73 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that regardless of RLUIPA the court could 
review the city’s denial of a special zoning permit based on system of individualized 
exemptions under strict scrutiny); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 
886 (D. Md. 1996) (finding the compelling interest test under Smith applied to a his-
toric preservation ordinance that created a system of individualized exemptions); Al-
pine Christian Fellowship v. County Comm’rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 993–94 (D. Colo. 
1994) (reviewing the city’s denial of a zoning permit to a church under strict scruti-
ny).  
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ties—which is unlikely to pass rational basis review—most churches 
must apply for a zoning variance or a conditional or temporary use 
permit.
179
  During the permit process, the local zoning board makes 
an individual determination on whether to grant the church an ex-
ception to zoning regulations, much like the discretion the govern-
ment has in deciding whether or not to give employment benefits 
that justified the Sherbert decision.
180
  Therefore, under Smith, church-
hosted tent city cases will be subject to strict scrutiny just as they are 
under RLUIPA. 
Judges also may be reluctant to give exemptions to churches out 
of fear that one religion will be favored over another or out of skep-
ticism regarding what constitutes an exercise of religious beliefs.
181
  
When the religious belief is not so clear, such as the case with tent ci-
ties, the reluctance of judges to grant relief under either RLUIPA or 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment may increase. 
C. Clearing up the Tests: Possible Solutions 
The protections of the Free Exercise Clause remain weak in 
comparison to other First Amendment rights.
182
  Congress has re-
sponded by enacting statutes, RFRA and RLUIPA, in an effort to pro-
tect the Free Exercise right.  While the first attempt failed both con-
stitutionally and in practice, the second attempt has also proven 
flawed.  The Court, however, is unlikely to overrule Smith or find a 
workable alternative to its test to overcome the criticism it has 
sparked and the confusion over the individualized exemptions and 
hybrid requirement.
183
  Thus, Congress must revise RLUIPA to avoid 
the flaws that are exposed by the church-hosted homeless shelter cas-
es.  This can be achieved by creating a uniform test for “substantial 
burden” under the statute. 
 
 179 If a religious institution fails to exhaust administrative remedies by at least ap-
plying for a permit and abiding by local laws, then the court will likely rule in favor of 
the city.  See Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“A church must exhaust its administrative remedies and 
cannot merely predict that it would be denied the permit if it were to apply.” (citing 
Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2003)), reh’g denied, 
No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009). 
 180 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
 181 See Lupu, supra note 38, at 593.  
 182 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Smith improperly restricted the Free Exercise Clause and reinter-
pretation is needed to “put our First Amendment jurisprudence back on course”).  
 183 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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The substantial burden definition of the Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits as substantial or significant pressure to compel a be-
liever to change his or her religious behavior and beliefs
184
 is ambi-
guous and subjective.  It requires judges to assess the importance of 
the religious practice to the individual’s or church’s religious beliefs, 
a result RLUIPA clearly intended to prevent with its expansive defini-
tion of religious exercise.
185
  It also fails to take into account the con-
text of each situation.  This is especially important in tent city cases 
where a religious exercise of providing shelter for those who are in 
need may be accomplished in a way that creates less of a nuisance for 
the surrounding community.  Often cities will conditionally deny a 
permit, refusing to grant the permit unless certain conditions are 
met.
186
  Under the Seventh Circuit test, a conditional denial would 
not in many cases render the practice “effectively impracticable”—
and it did not in Family Life Church.
187
 
The Washington Supreme Court test for substantial burden of-
fers a better solution.  There, the court looked at the alternatives 
available to churches and individuals to practice their faith under the 
challenged government regulation.
188
  While this invites subjective de-
terminations by judges, it correctly takes into account the context of 
each set of facts.  Thus, a church wishing to host a tent city must 
clearly define the religious practice that it is seeking to promote, 
whether it is a general ministry to help others or a more specific be-
 
 184 See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (de-
fining substantial burden as “when the government put[s] ‘substantial pressure on 
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs’” (quoting Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987))); Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining 
substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant pressure which directly coerces the 
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”); San Jose Christian 
Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 185 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any ex-
ercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 186 See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 
2007) (issuing a “negative declaration” that denied a religious institution a permit to 
expand their facilities contingent on a environmental impact finding); Tustin 
Heights Assoc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (deny-
ing a permit to build a church because of space concerns but granting a permit once 
amendments were made to plan); Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Morton, 
559 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (granting a permit to a religious school on the 
condition that the expansion included an enrollment cap).  
 187 See Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
 188 See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352; City of Woodinville v. Northshore Unit-
ed Church of Christ, 211 P.3d. 406, 411, n.4 (Wash. 2009). 
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lief in ensuring that everyone has appropriate shelter, and it must 
further show that no other alternative would be available.  In some 
instances, complying with applicable zoning regulations may leave 
open options for a church to host the camp with certain reasonable 
restrictions.
189
  By looking at the available options for the church or 
individual, courts can strike a compromise between the city and the 
church to balance the interests at stake and prevent churches from 
taking advantage of the expansive definition of religious exercise in 
RLUIPA. 
In addition, policy concerns may play a bigger role in church-
hosted tent cities, which a clearer definition of substantial burden 
would overcome.  Tent cities provide a solution to a community prob-
lem, and churches have the ability and resources to support the 
camps, alleviating the burden on local governments to deal with the 
problem of homelessness.  These camps, however, will impact the 
community and those living near the churches.
190
  Context is impor-
tant for courts.
191
  If there are other possible locations for the church 
to host a shelter, regardless of expense, courts may adjust their sub-
stantial burden determination.
192
  By creating a rule that forces courts 
to look at context, courts have the ability to examine factors that con-
tribute to a city’s decision to deny a permit, including public nuis-
ance concerns. 
Therefore, Congress should articulate a uniform test for substan-
tial burden under RLUIPA that incorporates the Northshore test and a 
 
 189 See, e.g., Northshore, 211 P.3d. at 411, n.4 (“[T]he Church conceded it would be 
possible to house Tent City inside the Church.  Worship traditionally takes place in-
side a church and this alternative would obviate many of the neighbor/city legitimate 
concerns.”). 
 190 Id. at 411.  
Housing the homeless affects those outside the church in a ways that 
private prayer or religious services inside the church buildings do not.  
Indeed, a homeless encampment likely affects the neighbors who live 
nearby far more than it impacts most parishioners who spend only 
hours in church weekly while neighbors must live continuously with the 
encampment. 
Id.  
 191 See, e.g., id. 
 192 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (Generally applicable laws 
that do not come with criminal prosecution but only “make the practice of their reli-
gious beliefs more expensive” do not impose a substantial burden.); Daytona Rescue 
Mission v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (denying 
relief in part because other facilities existed within city limits where the shelter could 
be located); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032–33 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (denying relief where church could have found other suit-
able property in a differently zoned area for its shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 
2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009). 
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consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding the alleged 
substantial burden on religious exercise.  A model test for a substan-
tial burden on a religious exercise would state the following: 
Considering all the factors surrounding the burden on religious 
exercise, a substantial burden exists where no reasonable alterna-
tive is available for the church to continue its religious exercise. 
Under this test, a conflict similar to the one between Western 
Presbyterian and Daytona Beach may still arise as differing courts em-
phasize various factors, but a uniform test will lessen the opportunity 
for those results.  Some scholars have argued that allowing judges to 
deny or grant exemptions based on weighing the interests of the city 
and the church in each individual situation will lead to inconsistent 
results and that courts should give more deference to legislative deci-
sions.
193
  A test that looks at the context of each situation may have an 
effect of inconsistent results in similar cases—whereas a test that lists 
specific factors draws a bright line to distinguish between cases—but 
certain contextual factors will distinguish cases.  There needs to be an 
effective check on zoning board decisions when a fundamental right 
is involved, especially because zoning boards are made up of politi-
cians and others who may be swayed by the majority.
194
  Granting too 
much deference to local zoning boards in these cases will only add to 
the inconsistency because different communities have different val-
ues; this proposed test allows courts to evaluate carefully the reason-
ing behind a zoning board’s decision. 
 
 193 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 295–
98 (2005); Marshall, supra note 153, at 311–12. 
 194 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response 
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 721 (1992). 
But the peculiar circumstances of minority religions and the danger of 
religious majoritarianism make it necessary to buttress the political 
checks with constitutional protections when the objection is based on 
adherence to religion (which, given the majoritarian character of the 
rule, will virtually always be a minority religion). 
Id. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Ac-
commodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 604 (1991).  
Exemptions granted by judges will rest exclusively on a foundation of 
general norms, applicable to free exercise claims from foundation of 
general norms, applicable to free exercise claims from across the “spec-
tral march” these cases exhibit.  In contrast, voluntary accommodations 
will rest on an uneasy and unprincipled foundation of concern for reli-
gious liberty and the political strength of pro-accommodation forces.  
Without the force of general principle, there can be no guarantee that 
like claims to accommodation will be treated alike; without such like 
treatment, equal religious liberty will be perpetually undermined. 
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By amending RLUIPA to include a uniform test for substantial 
burden that looks at the totality of the circumstances and the availa-
ble alternatives to the religious organization, Congress can eliminate 
the confusion over the application of the statute.  Closer religious ex-
ercise cases, like church-hosted tent cities, will be decided more con-
sistently according to the facts of each case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since Sherbert, courts and Congress have failed to articulate a 
workable test for the Free Exercise Clause, which has caused prob-
lems for courts ruling on religious-land-use cases. RLUIPA has pro-
vided a clearer standard for religious-land-use cases by articulating a 
strict scrutiny standard for substantial burdens on religious land use, 
but it also contains ambiguity with regard to what constitutes a sub-
stantial burden.  Church-hosted tent cities illustrate the extent of the 
problems with RLUIPA, but these cases demonstrate that a workable 
substantial burden test within the statute could alleviate its inconsis-
tent application in the lower courts.  The Washington Supreme Court 
has provided a basis for developing a practical test by examining the 
context of each situation and the alternatives left open to churches to 
continue their religious exercise following the government action in 
question.  This approach takes into account each individual set of 
facts, which is important in situations like tent cities, where the com-
peting interests of the city and the church are strong on both sides.  
The Free Exercise Clause has evolved in a short time from Sherbert to 
Smith and has taken on new challenges from the shelter cases to 
Northshore.  While the test does not currently embrace what the New 
Jersey Superior Court envisioned in St. John’s, a clear statutory test will 
permit courts, at the very least, to rule fairly in religious-land-use cas-
es. 
 
